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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HISTORIC
PROTECTION ACT
In an attempt to prevent dissipation of its historic endowment, the Dis-
trict of Columbia enacted the Historic Landmark and Historic District
Protection Act of 1978 (Historic Protection Act or Act).' The Act endeav-
ors to protect, enhance and perpetuate landmarks and districts represent-
ing the city's cultural and architectural history. While historic
preservation generally may imply protection of existing landmarks, the
Historic Protection Act reflects the framer's recognition that municipal
preservation activities must also prevent the destruction of historic settings
by the physical appearance of new construction.2 Under the Act, a party
who proposes new construction in an existing historic district must apply
to the mayor's agent for a construction permit.3 Application triggers the
Act's "design review process" 4 which, in essence, provides for appraisal of
the project by the Joint Committee of Landmarks (JCL) and final review
by the mayor's agent.
Under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act
(DCAPA),5 any person aggrieved by a decision of the mayor's agent under
1. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1001 to 5-1015 (1981 & Supp. 1983). The Act was submitted
to the District of Columbia City Council as D.C. Bill 2-367 on June 28, 1978, by Council-
man John A. Wilson. It was signed by Mayor Walter E. Washington.on Dec. 28, 1978, and
became law on March 3, 1979.
2. The relevant provision of the Historic Protection Act, § 5-1007, concerning new
construction, states:
(a) Before the Mayor may issue a permit to construct a building or structure in
an historic district . . . the Mayor shall review the permit application in accord-
ance with this section and shall place notice of the application in the District of
Columbia Register.
(e) In any case where the Mayor deems appropriate, or in which the applicant so
requests, the Mayor shall hold a public hearing on the permit application.
(f) The permit shall be issued unless the Mayor, after due consideration of the
zoning laws and regulations of the District of Columbia, finds that the design of the
building and character of the historic district are incompatible . ...
D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1007 (1981).
3. 1d at § 5-1007(a).
4. The term "design review process" is used by the court in Dupont Circle Citizens
Ass'n v. Barry, 455 A.2d 417, 419 (D.C. 1983), in referring to the procedural requirements of
§ 5-1007.
5. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1501 to 1-1510 (1981).
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the Historic Protection Act has recourse of appeal to the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals.6 The DCAPA, in turn, limits the court's jurisdiction
to the review of "contested cases."7 The court of appeals previously has
held that in order to constitute a "contested case," the controversy must
involve an aggrieved party who possesses a statutory or constitutional right
to a "trial-type hearing."8 The court recently addressed the question
whether a citizens' association possesses a statutory or constitutional right
to a hearing when new construction is proposed in an historic district. In
Dupont Circle Citizens Association v. Barry,9 the court held that the asserted
property interests of diminution in value and aesthetic blight were too
vague and speculative to entitle the Citizens' association to a "trial-type
hearing."'" The court thus found that the controversy did not constitute a
"contested case" and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction."
I. PROTECTED PROPERTY INTERESTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE
Although the scope of interests shielded by the fourteenth amendment
has widened greatly in the last decade,' 2 the United States Supreme Court
6. Id. at § 1-1510.
7. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1502(8) states:
The term "contested case" means a proceeding before the Mayor or any agency
in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by any
law (other than this subchapter), or by constitutional right, to be determined after a
hearing before the Mayor or before an agency ....
8. See, e.g., Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y, Inc. v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184, 187 (D.C.
App. 1979); Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 313
(D.C. 1974).
9. 455 A.2d 417 (D.C. 1983).
10. Id. at 423. In order to bring suit, the association must show that: (1) its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interest it seeks to protect is
germane to the association's purposes; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Washing-
ton State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). The Dupont Circle Citizens
Association (Association) is a chartered representative of its members and, therefore, is em-
powered to assert the economic and aesthetic injuries claimed by its members for the pur-
pose of establishing standing. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Specifically, the
injuries asserted by the Association were that the proposed construction of an office building
between Connecticut Avenue and N Street in the Dupont Circle Historic District would
cause a reduction in property values within the district and permanently damage the historic
character of that designated neighborhood. Dupont Circle, 455 A.2d at 421-22.
11. The court noted that the Association was not completely foreclosed from access to
judicial review: "Any party aggrieved by an agency's decision may initiate an equitable
action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to seek redress." Dupont Circle, 455
A.2d at 424 n.28.
12. See Rendleman, The New Due Process.- Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531
(1975). The author argues that due process has been extended into many spheres which had
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has stated that the range of protected interests is not infinite.' 3 In Board of
Regents v. Roth, ' 4 the Supreme Court outlined the scope of property inter-
ests which warrant constitutional protection, thereby singling out those in-
terests which must be accorded appropriate procedural safeguards.' 5 In
Roth, an assistant professor hired for a fixed term of one year to teach at a
state university was informed without explanation that he would not be
rehired. The rules promulgated by the university provided that no reason
need be given for nonretention of a nontenured teacher and specified no
standards for reemployment.' 6 Roth brought suit against the university
charging that the failure of university officials to give him notice of any
reason for nonretention or to provide an opportunity for a hearing violated
his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process. '7 Both the dis-
trict court and court of appeals ruled in Roth's favor, and the university
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court determined that "some kind of hearing"' 8 is required prior to
the deprivation of a protected property interest.' 9 If an individual is not
deprived of a statutory or constitutionally recognized property interest,
however, constitutional due process protection is unnecessary. 20 Because
previously escaped its influence, expanding procedural protections and remedies to include a
vast array of previously unprotected interests. Id at 532-34.
13. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
14. Id. at 564.
15. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Roth states that procedural due process re-
quirements apply only to acts that infringe upon those interests encompassed by the four-
teenth amendment's protection of liberty and property. Id at 569. An interest in property
arising from a legitimate claim of entitlement based upon an independent source, such as the
common law, constitutes such a protected interest. 1d at 577. In the context of historic
preservation, the common law recognizes that landowners are normally entitled to use their
property in any way that does not cause a nuisance. This entitlement creates a property
interest in the free use of land. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116, 121 (1928). While this interest in property is subject to the restrictions of the state's
police power, courts have long recognized that any legitimate use is properly within the
protection of the Constitution. 408 U.S. at 577.
16. 408 U.S. at 566.
17. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
18. The phrase "some kind of hearing" is drawn from an opinion by Justice White in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). One year later, it became the title of an
article written by Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Friendly, "Some Kind ofHearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). Judge
Friendly discusses the vast increase in the number and types of hearings required in all areas
in which the government and the individual interact, an increase he describes as a "due
process explosion." Id at 1268.
19. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
20. Id at 576-77.
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the terms of Roth's contract made no provision for renewal of employment
and because there was no state statute creating an interest in continued
employment, the Court concluded that Roth did not have a constitution-
ally cognizable property interest.2 It held that for a property interest to
warrant constitutional protection, a person must have a "legitimate claim
of entitlement" to the interest and not an abstract need or desire for it.22
The Supreme Court's reluctance to expand the scope of the property
interest beyond the Roth standard was demonstrated in O'Bannon v. Town
Court Nursing Center.23 The Court held that nursing home residents had
no constitutionally protected property interest in the home's continued
participation in the Medicaid program.24 It reasoned that because resi-
dents were obligated to pay for use of the home regardless of the home's
Medicaid status, they were only indirect beneficiaries of the home's partici-
pation in the program.25 Therefore, nursing center residents had no right
to a hearing prior to the home's decertification for failure to meet govern-
ment health standards. 26 The Court determined that since decertification
did not reduce or terminate a resident's financial assistance, but merely
required that he use those benefits for care at a different facility, regula-
tions granting Medicaid recipients the right to a hearing prior to decertifi-
cation were unnecessary.27
21. Id. at 578. As a matter of statutory law, a tenured teacher at a state university could
not be discharged except upon written charges and pursuant to certain procedures. A non-
tenured teacher, similarly, was protected to some extent during his one-year term. Rules
promulgated by Wisconsin State University provided that a nontenured teacher dismissed
before the end of his term may have an opportunity for review. But the rules provided no
protection for a nontenured teacher whose contract simply was not renewed. Id. at 567.
22. Id at 577. Justice Stewart noted that property interests are not created by the Con-
stitution. Rather, they are created by existing rules or understandings that stem from in-
dependent sources such as state law. Id. Thus, Roth's property interest in employment at
Wisconsin State University was defined by the terms of his employment, which did not
support Roth's claim of entitlement to reemployment. Nor, significantly, was there any state
statute or University rule which secured Roth's interest. Id. at 578.
23. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
24. Id. at 786. The Court noted that the matter did not involve a withdrawal of direct
benefits, which would constitute a deprivation of a protected interest. Rather, the case in-
volved the government's attempt to impose standards on health care facilities. The Court
construed the adverse impact caused by enforcement of those standards as indirect and inci-
dental, thereby not constituting a deprivation of life, liberty or property. Id. at 786-87.
25. Id. at 787-88.
26. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, agreed that the due process clause generally is uncon-
cerned with indirect deprivations of property interests. He asserted, however, that the ad-
verse impact of the home's decertification had a very real and direct effect on the home's
residents. Id. at 793-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 773-74. The Court indicated that while a resident has a right to continued
benefits for care in a qualified home, he has no enforceable expectation of continued benefits
for care in an unqualified home. Id at 786.
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In the realm of historic preservation, the Supreme Court similarly has
restricted the procedural due process protection available to parties who
challenge decisions made under preservation laws. In Penn Central v. New
York City,28 the Court ruled that a prohibition on construction of an office
tower atop Grand Central Station by New York City's Preservation Com-
mission was not a "taking" under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
and did not require compensation.29 The New York City Landmarks
Commission barred the contemplated construction on the ground that it
would have impaired the appearance of the station. The Penn Central
Company argued that the restriction would prevent it from earning a
greatly increased income from its property, but failed to show that it could
not earn a fair return from the station in its present form.3" The Court
upheld the construction prohibition on the theory that it represented a
valid exercise of the state's police power and not an unconstitutional tak-
ing.3 Although it alluded to the local government's role of providing
"standards, controls and incentives, '32 the Court did not address the pro-
cedural due process that must be afforded parties under a landmarks pres-
ervation program.
Conversely, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
28. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
29. Id at 123-28. The ruling validated the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Law, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976 & Supp. 1981-82), as a
proper exercise of the city's police power to regulate private property for the preservation of
historic values. Penn Central has spawned a wealth of commentary on the status of historic
preservation law. See, e.g., Samuels, After Penn Central. A Look Down the Track at Consti-
tutional Taking, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 230 (1980); Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Termi-
nal Decision: A Euclid for Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and A Resolution of the
Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731 (1978); Comment, Alas in Wonderland-
The Impact of Penn Central v. New York Upon Historic Preservation Law and Policy, 7 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317 (1978).
30. The Court also rejected Penn Central's argument that the original historic designa-
tion of the station was a "matter of taste" and therefore arbitrary. 438 U.S. at 132. It stated
that the argument had a "particularly hollow ring" as Penn Central had not sought judicial
review of the designation decision. Id. at 132-33.
31. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that "[N]o person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court held the fifth amendment due process clause appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
32. 438 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1978). Several procedural challenges to some of the 600
county and municipal historic preservation ordinances, as well as various state and federal
landmark designation statutes, have already been heard by courts. See, e.g., Jennewein v.
City Council of Wilmington, 46 N.C. App. 324, 264 S.E.2d 802 (1980) (invalidating Council
decision based on information outside the record); Southern Nat'l Bank v. City of Austin,
582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (lack of articulable standards).
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ginia recently invalidated the federal government's National Historic
Landmark program because the program failed to provide due process
protections to landowners within the historic district. In Historic Green
Springs, Inc. v. Bergland,3 neighboring property owners challenged a fed-
eral government decision to designate a 14,000 acre district in Virginia as a
national historic landmark because the government failed to prepare and
publish rules of procedure to govern the designation process.34 The De-
partment of the Interior argued unsuccessfully that the designation did not
affect property interests of area landowners and that any potential effects
on property interests were merely speculative.35 The court noted that na-
tional landmark designation "targets" a property for acquisition by the
state through the power of eminent domain.36 Acquisition, in turn, may
result in the delay or denial of federal assistance to a land development
project.37 Although a landowner has neither an entitlement to nor a pro-
tected property interest in the federal development assistance itself, the
court recognized the extent of federal involvement in private and public
land development.38 Because of federal involvement in private land devel-
opment, the court determined that the denial of federal assistance may
effectively preclude private uses to which a property owner might other-
wise be entitled.39 It concluded that, absent procedural due process pro-
tections, historic designation under the National Historic Preservation Act
33. 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980).
34. Id. at 845. The landowners also charged that the designation of the land as an
historic district constituted a taking for public use without just compensation in violation of
the fifth amendment, but the Court rejected that argument. Id at 848-49.
35. Id at 853.
36. Id. Section 462 of the 1966 Preservation Act provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary of the Interior . . . for the purpose of effectuating the policy ex-
pressed in section 461 of this title (to preserve historic sites, buildings and objects of
national significance), shall have the following powers and perform the following
duties and functions:
(d) [Aicquire in the name of the United States by gift, purchase or otherwise any
property, personal or real, or any interest or estate therein ....
16 U.S.C. § 462 (1982).
37. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 853.
38. Id. at 853-54. The listing of a site in the National Register of Historic Places triggers
the "federal involvement" restrictions of § 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. 16
U.S.C. § 470f (1982).
39. See Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp. at 853-54. In many instances the effect of
federal development assistance on private development rights may be readily apparent. See,
e.g., Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 476 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (urban renewal
funding). In other circumstances, however, such a claim may be subject to challenge by the
government on the ground it is too speculative. See, e.g., Waterbury Action to Conserve
Our Heritage, Inc. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979).
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violated the due process rights of landowners within the district.4 °
In considering a similar challenge to a local historic preservation ordi-
nance, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in
Zartman v. Reisem4' held that the interests of adjoining landowners in
preservation of landmarks were not of constitutional dimension.42 The
preservation statute at issue in Zartman provided that application for con-
struction, alteration or demolition of a structure in an historic district must
be approved by the preservation board.43 In reviewing an application, the
board must determine whether the proposed construction, alteration or
demolition is consistent with the historic character of the district." While
the court acknowledged the legitimate interests of adjoining landowners
particularly, and of the public generally, in the preservation of historic
landmarks and historic districts, it refused to elevate those interests to a
constitutionally protected status.45 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the landowners were not entitled to the procedural safeguards of notice
and a hearing.46
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has had similar occasion to
consider the due process rights of a citizen association under the District's
historic preservation program. The court has been steadfast in granting
review of administrative decisions made pursuant to the District's Historic
Protection Act only where the appellant enjoyed a statutory or constitu-
tional right to a "trial-type" hearing at the agency level.47 A jurisdictional
prerequisite, then, has been the appellant's demonstration of a judicially
recognized and protected property interest.
40. See 497 F. Supp. at 856-57. The procedural due process problem for federal historic
designation may be alleviated by the National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987 (1980), (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1982)). These
amendments, enacted after Historic Green Springs, require that notice of proposed designa-
tion be given to affected landowners. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(6) (1982).
41. 59 A.D.2d 237, 399 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1977).
42. 399 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
43. Id. at 509. The nine-member board was composed of at least one member of the
Rochester Real Estate Board, one member of the Landmark Society, one registered archi-
tect, and four residents from preservation districts. Id
44. Id. The court noted that the board's decisions concerning whether changes are per-
missible involve judgment and expertise. Id The court stated that the governing considera-
tion is not beauty or taste, but whether the change will preserve or interfere with the
qualities of the particular location. Id at 510.
45. Id The court's decision to uphold the ordinance against a due process attack was
greatly influenced by the facts of this case. The proposed improvement, a tennis court, was
to be located in a large backyard in a residential area and was not visible from the street.
Further, the improvement was not to a designated landmark, but was simply located in an
historic district. Id at 508, 510.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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48In Capitol Hill Restoration Society, Inc. v. Moore, a restoration society
sought review of housing agency approval of a developer's plan of subdivi-
sion. The developer's plan called for the demolition of three buildings to
make possible a new townhouse development. Because the subdivision
concerned land located in an historically designated district, the District of
Columbia Historic Sites Subdivision Amendment of 197649 (Subdivision
Ordinance) was applicable. Pursuant to the Subdivision Ordinance, the
Joint Committee on Landmarks convened a public meeting at which the
Capitol Hill Restoration Society objected to the proposed design of the
townhouses. Despite these protests, the JCL unanimously recommended
approval of the developer's plan and the housing agency concurred.5°
The restoration society appealed the agency determination to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals. Although conceding that it was not
entitled to a trial-type hearing at the administrative level, the society ar-
gued that the court's jurisdiction stemmed from the grant of review in the
District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA). 51 In dis-
missing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, Judge Harris noted that the
judicial review provision of the DCAPA provides for direct review only in
a "contested case."52 The court held that the jurisdictional determinant
was whether the housing agency proceeding constituted a "contested case"
within the ambit of the DCAPA.53 It found that agency approval of the
subdivision plan was a policy decision and did not constitute an adjudica-
tory hearing.54 The court concluded that since it had not placed a "con-
tested case" before the court, the society was foreclosed from appeal.55
48. 410 A.2d 184 (D.C. 1979).
49. Law of June 29, 1976, D.C. Law 1-80, 22 D.C. Reg. 7240 (repealed 1979). The
procedure for agency review of proposed plans of subdivision has been incorporated in D.C.
CODE ANN. § 5-1006 (1981).
50. 410 A.2d at 186.
51. Id. at 186-87. The DCAPA delineates proper judicial review procedures and de-
fines the term "contested case." D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1501 to 1-1510 (1981). The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals is authorized to review agency action in accordance with the
DCAPA. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-722, 5-1012 (1981).
52. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
53. 410 A.2d at 186.
54. See id at 187. Pursuant to the Subdivision Ordinance, the function of the JCL and
the housing agency is to determine whether the proposed subdivision would be contrary to
the public interest. The restoration society contended that a statement of reasons must sup-
port the decision; however, the Subdivision Ordinance was silent on the issue. Id
55. Id. at 187-88. The court observed that the society was not, however, entirely fore-
closed from judicial review of the agency decisions. Id at 188. The court noted that any




II. THE DUE PROCESS IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION
With guidance from the Supreme Court's delineation of constitutionally
protected property interests, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
recently ruled that the interests of a neighborhood association are not of
sufficient magnitude to trigger a due process right to a hearing on a devel-
oper's application for new construction in an historic district. In Dupont
Circle Citizens Association v. Barry,5 6 the International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) submitted an application on Octo-
ber 29, 1979, to the mayor's agent for a construction permit to build an
office building on vacant land in the Dupont Circle historic district.57 Ac-
cordingly, the "design review process" under the Historic Protection Act
was triggered, and IAM's application was referred to the Joint Committee
on Landmarks for a recommendation on the compatibility of the proposed
project with the character of the historic district.58 During the following
year, the JCL held seven public meetings at which IAM and the Dupont
Circle Citizens Association (Association) presented opposing views con-
cerning the proposed construction.59
After an initial denial of the permit,6° IAM modified its proposal and
the mayor's agent gave approval. 6' The Association appealed the adminis-
trative decision to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, charging
that refusal by the mayor's agent to grant a hearing violated its constitu-
tionally protected right to due process.62 The court of appeals adhered to
the "legitimate claim of entitlement" standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Roth, and found that the Association's interests were too vague
56. 455 A.2d 417 (D.C. 1983).
57. Id. at 419.
58. Id. at 419-20. The relevant provision of the Historic Protection Act, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 5-1007(b) (1981), states: "Prior to making the finding on the permit application...
the Mayor may refer the application to the Historic Preservation Review Board for a recom-
mendation ......
59. 455 A.2d at 420. The Association attended each JCL meeting and presented both
oral and documentary evidence. Id. It argued that the proposed design of the building
clashed with the architecture of the historic district. Id
60. The initial permit was denied because the JCL found that the proposed design
presented "a flat horizontally banded wall ... in contrast with the repeated vertical patterns
of the predominant historical design." Id at 419.
61. IAM resubmitted its application containing significant revisions in the building's
design which adequately addressed the JCL's concerns. Id.
62. Id at 418-19. The pertinent section of the Historic Protection Act, § 5-1007(e),
states that a hearing is required only upon request of the applicant (herein IAM), or where
the mayor's agent deems appropriate. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1007(e) (1981). The court was
unpersuaded by the Association's assertion that it was "unfair" to permit an aggrieved appli-
cant to demand a hearing while not providing the same right to "injured" property owners.
Dupont Circle, 455 A.2d 417, 422 (1983).
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and speculative to command procedural due process safeguards.63 Judge
Kern first noted that the Association had no statutory authority under the
Historic Protection Act to compel the mayor's agent to hold a hearing on
proposed new construction.64 He then cited Roth as the benchmark deter-
minant of whether the property interests of the citizens' group merited con-
stitutional protection.65 Judge Kern reasoned that "speculative diminution
in property values" and "alleged aesthetic blight" on the character of the
historic district were not deprivations of property deserving of the due pro-
cess shield.66 Because the Association's interests were not of constitutional
magnitude, the mayor's agent was not remiss in denying the Association a
hearing. The court concluded, therefore, that the appeal did not constitute
a "contested case," and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.67
Dupont Circle does not advance the proposition that the interests of a
neighborhood association are not deserving of procedural safeguards. In-
deed, Judge Kern noted that the Historic Protection Act provides citizens'
associations the right to demand a hearing when demolition or alteration
of an historic structure is proposed.6" The court reasoned that construction
of a new structure does not pose as great a danger of injury to the historic
district as does the demolition or alteration of an existing structure, and
63. Dupont Circle, 455 A.2d at 423. The court noted that "it strains credibility to find
constitutional protection for the Association's interest in preserving the character of the
neighborhood." Id at 423 n.26. Such interest, the court observed, is adequately protected
by the District of Columbia zoning laws. Id
64. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
65. 455 A.2d at 423.
66. Id. at 423. The due process clause clearly protects the owner's interest in property
that is the subject of historic preservation proceedings. See generally Developments in the
Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1522-24 (1978). It is less clear whether the interests of
third parties are protected by the due process clause. The most common third party interest
is probably the economic one of diminution in value. Such an interest reflects the concern of
property owners over the potential loss of various uses of a property resulting from govern-
mental restrictions placed on the property of another. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian
Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 548, 492 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1972) (proposed development would affect
value and use of plaintiffs land). Another commonly asserted third party interest is the
property owner's expectation that his neighborhood will retain its particular character. See
Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1517 (1978). In general, a land-
owner has a right to a particular zoning pattern. Kent v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 74 R.I. 89,
91-92, 58 A.2d 623, 624 (1948). Several courts, however, have held that persons who have
relied on a particular property classification have some type of property interest in that clas-
sification. See Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103, 110 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976) (property owners have right to rely on zoning classification unless public interest
changes); Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Mo. App. 1972) (purchasers have right to
rely on zoning ordinance).
67. Dupont Circle, 455 A.2d at 423-24.
68. Id. at 422. The relevant provision of the Historic Preservation Act may be found at
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1004 to 5-1005 (1981).
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thus, construction requires lesser scrutiny.69 The court's reasoning is
sound. Alteration or demolition necessarily connotes a change in an ex-
isting structure that specifically had been designated for historic preserva-
tion. New construction, while altering the landscape of an historic district,
does not endanger existing landmarks.
Further reason for the court's denial of review stemmed from its recog-
nition that administrative decisions made pursuant to the Historic Protec-
tion Act are unique, aesthetic judgments within the expertise of the JCL.7"
By acknowledging this expertise, the court did not abandon its responsibil-
ity as a reviewing body. Judge Kern observed that the Association had
access to all JCL hearings, and that the concerns of the group had been
considered exhaustively by the JCL, as well as by the mayor's agent.7
Judge Kern wisely declined to substitute his judgment on the aesthetic
quality of the proposed building design for that of the JCL. Rather, the
court limited its review to the procedural safeguards afforded the Associa-
tion in the "design review process." Accordingly, it held that the asserted
interests of the Association were protected adequately by the "design re-
view process" of the Historic Protection Act.7 2
In light of the significant procedural due process safeguards extant in the
Historic Protection Act, the Dupont Circle court's reasoning is consistent
with prior decisions made under historic preservation law. The Associa-
tion's opportunity to participate in the decision making process of the JCL
clearly influenced Judge Kern's denial of review. 7 In contrast, the court
in Historic Green Springs74 was persuaded to sustain the appeal of the
neighboring landowners because of the lack of procedural protections pro-
vided by the National Historic Preservation Act. 75 Because the landown-
69. The court noted that the District of Columbia City Council intentionally afforded
different treatment to permit applications for new construction as opposed to those for dem-
olition or alteration of existing structures. 455 A.2d at 422 n.24. The court stated:
[I]t appears to us that there is inherent logic in mandating the scrutiny, provided
by a public hearing, or a permit application which seeks to remove or change a
building or buildings within a historic district. Presumably, demolition of a build-
ing will permanently alter a portion of the very reason for which an area has been
deemed a historic district. Construction of a new building, so long as an adequate
design review process is established, does not pose the same dangers.
Id
70. Id. at 424.
71. Id at 423-24 n.27. The court noted that a "full-blown" hearing would be unlikely
to produce any material facts not previously considered by the JCL or the mayor's agent.
Id.
72. Id at 424. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D.Va. 1980).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
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ers in Historic Green Springs had no statutory right to participate in the
administrative decision to designate the adjoining land an historic site, the
court invalidated the designation.76 It found that, while the restrictions
burdening the landowners' property were insufficient to constitute a taking
under the fifth amendment, the restrictions were of sufficient magnitude to
warrant procedural due process protection.
77
Similar analysis can be discerned in Penn Central8 and Zartman.79 In
both cases, historic preservation programs which provided due process
safeguards were sustained against due process attacks. The New York
statute at issue in Penn Centralprovided for a public hearing prior to dem-
olition or alteration of a designated landmark.8" Similarly, the ordinance
applied in Zartman required notice and a hearing to landowners whose
property interests merited protection.8' It appears, then, that administra-
tive findings rendered under statutory schemes which provide procedural
safeguards for aggrieved parties are less likely to be disturbed by courts.
Judge Kern's finding that the property interests of the citizens' group did
not meet Roth standards inevitably led to dismissal of the group's appeal.
Prior decisions of the court, such as Capitol Hill,82 are conclusive in deter-
mining the court's jurisdiction.83 If a property interest does not merit due
process protection, a "trial-type hearing" is not required. If a "trial-type
hearing" is unnecessary, the matter is not a "contested case." Thus, Judge
Kern has made the logical conclusion. The court of appeals has jurisdic-
tion only to review agency action in a contested case.
III. CONCLUSION
Proceedings before historic preservation agencies often involve crucial
determinations of property rights. Courts reviewing decisions made pursu-
ant to historic preservation statutes have attempted to limit the discretion
of administrators by requiring that procedural standards be provided af-
76. It is clear from Historic Green Springs that even nominal designation may interfere
with the use and enjoyment of a landowner's property. In that case, for example, there was
evidence that designation resulted in delays in local mining operations, and caused a steel
company to abandon plans to locate a mill in the area. Historic Green Springs, 497 F. Supp.
at 849.
77. Id at 857. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
78. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
79. 399 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1977).
80. N.Y. ADMIN CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-2 to 207-7 (1976).
81. Zartman, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
82. 410 A.2d 184 (D.C. 1979).
83. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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fected parties before important private interests may be infringed upon.84
Historic Green Springs illustrates the courts' disapproval of preservation
statutes devoid of procedural protection for affected landowners. Con-
versely, Dupont Circle demonstrates the courts' reluctance to expand the
due process rights of aggrieved parties beyond the reasonable procedural
safeguards provided by the Historic Preservation Act. A trial-type eviden-
tiary hearing is not required, but those affected must be guaranteed the
right to an impartial decisionmaker, a reasoned decision with specific find-
ings, and ascertainable standards to permit effective challenge and review.
In those jurisdictions which have required greater procedural protection
for affected landowners, the valid goals of landmark preservation have not
been compromised.85 The procedural safeguards provided by the District
of Columbia Historic Protection Act evince a due process approach well-
suited to meet the valid claims of objecting landowners, while allowing the
flexibility needed to ensure a manageable historic preservation program.
David Della Porta
84. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(required agency to formulate standards and provide statement of findings as basis for re-
fusal to suspend registration of pesticide).
85. See Johnston, Legal Issues of Historic Preservationfor Local Government, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 707 (1981). Johnston examines the North Carolina Historic Preservation
Act and determines that the Act's strict regulatory provisons have not hampered the success
of historic preservation nor unduly burdened the private sector.
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